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THE SECRET TO SUCCESS:
AN EXAMINATION OF NEW YORK STATE
MEDIATION RELATED LITIGATION
Andrew N. Weisberg*
In October 2006, I conducted a voluntary mediation session in a
small claims court in New York City.  After more than an hour of
mediating, including caucuses with each party, the two former busi-
ness associates failed to settle their dispute.  The case did not settle
because the plaintiff sought unreasonable amounts of monetary
and non-monetary compensation.  Although I gain a sense of ac-
complishment when I help parties settle, I understand that not
every case can reach a mediated settlement.  I recognize that if I
use a more forceful approach toward the parties I could likely set-
tle more cases.  Instead, I inform the parties that they are engaged
in a voluntary mediation session and that I will facilitate a discus-
sion between them, rather than render a decision in the case like an
arbitrator or a judge.  Ultimately, if the case is resolved through
mediation, it will only occur if both parties agree to the terms of
the settlement.
This is the correct approach for a mediator to adopt when acting
as a court-appointed mediator in a voluntary court-annexed media-
tion program.  If I were to offer my own opinion on the merits of
each party’s argument or use a more forceful approach and “bully”
parties into settling their cases, I would run the risk of having par-
ties sign an agreement with which they are not likely to comply.
Adopting such an approach might result in two negative effects:
(1) the approach defeats the purpose of mediation, namely party
self-determination; and (2) the approach increases the likelihood of
parties resorting to the courts to either request enforcement or to
contest the validity of the mediated agreement.  Thus, in a case
such as the one involving former business associates, where it is
evident that the parties would not likely comply with settlement
terms, I am comfortable and frankly happy that the parties do not
reach a mediated settlement and instead allow the court to decide
their case.  Forcing the parties to reach an agreement neither is
* Fordham University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008.  Many thanks to Pro-
fessor Beth Schwartz for her tireless assistance and helpful comments during the
drafting stage of this Comment.
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likely to be satisfied with would leave the courts in the uncomforta-
ble position of determining whether or not to enforce the mediated
agreement.1
INTRODUCTION
The implementation of forms of alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) continues to increase as courts recognize the value of
ADR as a means of lightening their caseload.2  Unfortunately, not
every attempt at alternative dispute resolution succeeds.  While
mediation often results in settlement, post-settlement issues occa-
sionally arise over enforcement of the mediated agreement.  When
this occurs the court must determine whether it is proper to en-
force the agreement.  If, however, the central principle of media-
tion is self-determination by the parties, does court enforcement of
mediated agreements defeat the purpose of mediation?
This Comment analyzes reported decisions of challenges to
agreements reached through mediation.  Specifically, the Comment
addresses how often enforcement issues arise and the typical
grounds on which parties rely when seeking to vacate or modify
mediated agreements.  Part I discusses the research conducted on
New York state cases decided between January 1, 2004 and Octo-
ber 31, 2006.  Part II describes research conducted by Hamline
University School of Law Professors Coben and Thompson.3  This
research analyzes decisions in cases involving mediation through-
out the United States from 1999 through 2003.  Part III compares
the decisions of New York state courts to decisions in the United
States generally and attempts to reconcile the differences.  While
Professors Coben and Thompson found a large percentage of deci-
sions involving enforcement issues, the research for this Comment
found a significantly lower percentage of decisions that addressed
those issues in New York State.  Part IV addresses whether it is
1. During the fall semester of 2006 I participated in the Mediation Clinic at Ford-
ham Law School.  The course, taught by Professor Beth Schwartz, trains students in
mediation techniques and places students as court-appointed mediators in Small
Claims Courts in various boroughs of New York City.  I served as a mediator in
Manhattan.
2. See Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49
DRAKE L. REV. 367, 369 (2001); Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determi-
nation in Court-Connected Mediation:  The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 59 (2001).
3. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony:  A Systematic
Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006).
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proper for courts to hear requests to set aside or modify agree-
ments reached in mediation.
I. REPORTED DECISIONS INVOLVING MEDIATED SETTLEMENTS
IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS
Between January 1, 2004 and October 31, 2006, there were
57,407 reported decisions from the New York state courts.4  Of the
nearly 60,000 decisions, only ninety-eight mentioned the word
“mediate,” or any conjugation of the word.5  Further, only twelve
of the ninety-eight decisions referenced a mediated settlement
agreement.6  The eighty-six decisions which concerned mediation
but did not mention a mediated settlement agreement involved an
array of issues, resulting from various uses of the word “mediate”
and its conjugations.  Twenty-three cases referenced an unsuccess-
ful mediation, typically included as background to the litigation.7
4. Based on a November 8, 2006, search on LexisNexis through the “NY State
Cases, Combined” database. See infra tbl. 1.
5. Based on a November 6, 2006, search on LexisNexis through the “NY State
Cases, Combined” database for the term “mediat!” in cases occurring between Janu-
ary 1, 2004, and October 31, 2006.  The search occasionally produces only ninety-
seven results.  The ninety-eighth case, which appeared on the November 6, 2006
search, is Shomron v. Fuks, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2971 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006).
The decision is dated September 27, 2006.  The identical case, which appears each
time the search is conducted, is Shomron v. Fuks, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3068 (Sup.
Ct. Sept. 25, 2006).  The latter decision is dated September 25, 2006.  If the former
case citation is entered, LexisNexis instructs the user that “[t]he Opinion Previously
Reported at this Citation is now Reported at: 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3068, 2006 NY
Slip Op 52047U; 236 N.Y.L.J. 74,” which is the citation for the latter case.
6. Town of Southampton v. N.Y. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 813 N.E.2d
602, 605 (N.Y. 2004); Brown v. Governele, 815 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div. 2006);
Frazier v. Penraat, 822 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22, 25 (App. Div. 2006); 474431 Assocs. v. AXA
Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co., 795 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (App. Div. 2005); Carney v. Car-
ozza, 792 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643-45 (App. Div. 2005); Agostini-Knops v. Knops, 783
N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (App. Div. 2004); Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 819 N.Y.S.2d 908,
910 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Rachel C.H. v. Timothy S., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1282 at *2
(Sup. Ct. June 28, 2005); Gordon v. Roselli, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1659, at *2 (Sup.
Ct. June 29, 2004); Mcleod v. O’Brien, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2733 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 1,
2004); Frazier v. Penraat, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2779, at *3, *9 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 16,
2004), rev’d, 822 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 2006); J.R.M. v. P.A.M., 2004 N.Y. Misc
LEXIS 1708, at *2, *3 (Fam. Ct. June 21, 2004).
7. C.S.A. Contracting Corp. v. N.Y. Sch. Constr. Auth., 833 N.E.2d 266, 267
(N.Y. 2005); Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Pitofsky, 824 N.E.2d 929, 931 (N.Y.
2005); Schubert v. Schubert, 823 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (App. Div. 2006); SKR Design
Group, Inc. v. Avidon, 822 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (App. Div. 2006); Duane Reade, Inc. v. Doe,
818 N.Y.S.2d 208, 209 (App. Div. 2006); Braun v. 941 Park Ave., Inc., 816 N.Y.S.2d
58, 60 (App. Div. 2006); Piazza Bros., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Mahopac Cent. Sch.
Dist., 814 N.Y.S.2d 726, 726 (App. Div. 2006); Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Piazza
Bros., Inc., 815 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (App. Div. 2006); Locke v. Aston, 814 N.Y.S.2d 38,
40 (App. Div. 2006); Duane Reade v. Doe, 805 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (App. Div. 2005),
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Fifteen cases contained a discussion of a contract or agreement be-
tween the parties requiring mediation, and often arbitration.8 Six
cases referred to a statute, set of rules, or procedures containing
the word “mediation.”9  Six cases either cited a case whose name
included the word “mediation” or “mediators,” or used the word
“mediation” in discussing a case cited by the court.10  Four cases
vacated, 818 N.Y.S.2d 208 (App. Div. 2006); Laratro v. City of N.Y., 808 N.Y.S.2d 145,
149 (App. Div. 2005); Jakubowicz v. A.C. Green Elec. Contractors, Inc., 803 N.Y.S.2d
71, 73 (App. Div. 2005); Griffin v. Anslow, 793 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (App. Div. 2005);
Nunez v. Res. Warehousing & Consolidation, 775 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (App. Div. 2004);
Sarigul v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 772 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (App. Div. 2004) (Mazzarelli, J., dis-
senting in part); Citlak v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3179, at
*8 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 3, 2006); Andersen v. Weinroth, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2333, at *14
(Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 2006); Connolly v. Han-Tsien Tuan, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1548, at
*2 (Sup. Ct. June 23, 2006); Warren v. Giambra, 813 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (Sup. Ct. 2006);
Springer v. Fensterstock & Partners, LLP, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 338, at *2 (Sup. Ct.
Feb. 24, 2006); Hughes v. UPS, 798 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 2004); Brendan N. v. Tina
Marie R., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1074, at *4 (Fam. Ct. May 4, 2006); Lakeside Family
& Children’s Servs. v. Conchita, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2827, at *49 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 7,
2005).
8. Dhillon v. HealthNow N.Y., Inc., 821 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 2006);
Lakeland Fire Dist. v. E. Area Gen. Contractors, Inc., 791 N.Y.S.2d 594, 595-96 (App.
Div. 2005); Zach Assocs. v. Setauket Fire Dist., 783 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 2004);
Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 783 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (App. Div. 2004); Morris v.
Signorelli, 779 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (App. Div. 2004); Harmon v. Ivy Walk Inc., 2006
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3028, at *21 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 2006); Martian Entm’t, LLC v. Harris,
2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2108, at *4 (Sup. Ct. July 5, 2006); In re Spivak Architect P.C.
v. Northside Tower Realty, LLC, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2606 (Sup. Ct. June 7, 2006);
Biosynexus, Inc. v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 816 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Barracks v.
Metro N. Commuter R.R., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2847 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2005);
Globaldata Mgmt. Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2847 (Sup. Ct. Nov.
23, 2005); ILM v. RM, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2547, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 2005);
MG v. EG, 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2367, 21 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 2005); Royal Indem.
Co. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1052 (Sup. Ct. June 29,
2004); Beckhard Richlan Szerbaty & Assocs., L.L.P. v. AMCC Corp., 2004 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1406 (Sup. Ct. May 25, 2004).
9. Dalton v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1190, 1207 (N.Y. 2005) (referencing a stat-
ute containing the word “mediator”); N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Transp. Workers Union,
822 N.Y.S.2d 579, 593 (App. Div. 2006) (referencing a statute containing the word
“mediation”); N.Y. Cooling Towers, Inc. v. Goidel, 805 N.Y.S.2d 779, 781 (Sup. Ct.
2005) (referencing the American Arbitration Association Construction Industry Arbi-
tration Rules and Mediation Procedures); Children’s Rights v. N.Y. Office of Chil-
dren & Family Servs., 2005 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 288, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005)
(discussing a Social Services’ Law exemption which applies to mediation plans); CIT
Project Fin., L.L.C. v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2738,
at *5 (Sup. Ct. June 17, 2004) (referencing the American Arbitration Association
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures); Cambridge v. Allen, 2005
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2434, at *2 (Civ. Ct.  Nov. 1, 2005) (referencing the American
Arbitration Association Construction Industry Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures).
10. Muriel Siebert & Co. v. Intuit, Inc., 820 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (App. Div. 2006) (us-
ing the word “mediator” to discuss a distinguishable case presented by plaintiff);
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used the word but intended a meaning unrelated to alternative dis-
pute resolution.11  Four cases referred to a governmental agency
containing the word “mediation” in its name.12  Four cases dis-
cussed the rules of the New York State Fee Dispute Resolution
Program.13  In three cases, the court ordered the parties to engage
in mediation.14  The remaining twenty-one decisions used the word
in various ways.15
Bahnken v. N.Y. City Fire Dep’t, 794 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316 (App. Div. 2005) (citing a
case which includes the word “mediation”); Keyspan-Ravenswood, Inc. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 776 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146 (App. Div. 2004) (citing a case which includes the
word “mediation”); Gordon v. Vill. of Bronxville, 799 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 2004)
(discussing two cases involving mediators); Railworks Corp. v. Villafane Elec. Corp.,
788 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (discussing a case where the Court found that
although parties used the word “mediate” in their agreement, they meant to use arbi-
trate); Morgado Family Partners, LP v. Lipper, 800 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (cit-
ing a case which includes the word “mediators”).
11. Fraser v. 301-52 Townhouse Corp., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2704, 23, at *43,
*64 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2006) (discussing a water-damaged apartment; used phrases
including “release of inflammatory mediators” and “mycotoxin-mediated disease”);
Oneida County v. DiCastro, 780 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (discussing a county’s
responsibility when re-mediating a nuisance); Haskins v. Allstate Ins., 798 N.Y.S.2d
344 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (referencing a concrete mediator while describing an automobile
accident); Kardas v. Union Carbide Corp., 2004 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 240, at *3, *4, *10-
13, *16 n.18 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 25, 2004) (using the phrase “male-mediated off-site expo-
sure”), appeal dismissed, 801 N.Y.S.2d 916 (App. Div. 2005).
12. Rubin v. Tax Appeals Tribunal of N.Y., 814 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805 (App. Div.
2006) (referencing the New York State Bureau of Conciliation and Mediation);
Fuchsberg & Fuchsberg v. Comm’r of Taxation & Fin., 786 N.Y.S.2d 257, 258 (App.
Div. 2004) (mentioning the New York State Bureau of Conciliation and Mediation
Services); Harold Levinson Assocs., Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 2005
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2931, at *2 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2005) (referencing the New York
State Bureau of Conciliation and Mediation); Goyer v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl.
Conservation, 813 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (referencing the Office of Hear-
ings and Mediation Services).
13. Wexler & Burkhart, LLP v. Grant, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1316, at *1-2 (Sup.
Ct. May 25, 2006); Borah, Goldstein, Altschuler, Schwartz, & Nahins, PC v.
Lubnitzki, 822 N.Y.S.2d 425, 425-27 (Civ. Ct. 2006); Calendar, P.C. v. Edwards, 822
N.Y.S.2d 422, 424 (Civ. Ct. 2006); Batshever v. Okin, 827 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (Civ. Ct.
2006).
14. Ruch v. Ivy Walk Constr. Co.,  2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13688, at *1 (App.
Div. Dec. 1, 2005); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maloy Restoration, Inc., 2006 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 2821, at *4 (Sup. Ct. July 12, 2006); Olsen v. James Miller Marine Serv., Inc.,
792 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (ordering the parties to engage in mediation if
necessary).
15. People v. Patterson, 833 N.E.2d 223, 224 (N.Y. 2005) (discussing the United
States Supreme Court mediating between interests); Indemini v. Beth Israel Med.
Ctr., 823 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (N.Y. 2005) (dismissing a claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies); Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73 (App.
Div. 2006) (discussing the power of the court-appointed special master to mediate
cases); Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 806 N.Y.S.2d 19, 20 (App. Div. 2005) (discuss-
ing a court-appointed special master who possessed the power to mediate the case),
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The discussion above offers an in-depth survey of the range of
issues raised in New York state cases involving mediation over the
specified thirty-four month span.  As previously mentioned, this
Comment focuses on enforcement of mediated settlements.  There-
fore, it is necessary to examine the twelve cases involving mediated
settlements.  In six of those decisions, enforcement was not an issue
because the parties did not contest the validity of the mediated set-
tlement.16  The other cases required the court to determine
whether or not to enforce a mediated agreement.
vacated, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 2006); People v. Russell, 791 N.Y.S.2d 198, 200
(App. Div. 2005) (discussing a victim’s attempt to act as a mediator); Lewittes v.
Lewittes, 784 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (App. Div. 2004) (discussing defendant’s right to me-
diate); Martin v. Feltingoff, 777 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App. Div. 2004) (discussing which
attorneys prepared the case for mediation); Hoeffner v. Orrick, Herrington & Sut-
cliffe, LLP, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3108, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2006) (discussing
attorney-client communications about possible mediated settlements); Shomron v.
Fuks, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2971, at *7 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (discussing witnesses’ testi-
mony about mediating a fight between the defendants); Shomron v. Fuks, 2006 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 3068, at *7 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (discussing witnesses’ testimony about medi-
ating a fight between the defendants); Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 820 N.Y.S.2d 745,
747 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (referencing an attorney possessing the power to mediate discov-
ery issues); P.K. v. R.K., 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1436, at *2 (Sup. Ct. June 2, 2006)
(discussing how the parties ceased mediating their divorce settlement because they
reconciled); Campbell v. Campbell, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1115, at *8 (Sup. Ct. Mar.
6, 2006) (referencing an attorney who acted as mediator, attorney, and financial advi-
sor in a negotiation); Pondview Corp. v. Russand, Inc., 2005 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 2681,
at *10 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 2005) (encouraging parties to engage in mediation in lieu of
a settlement conference); LS v. LF, 803 N.Y.S.2d 881, 889 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (discussing
the roles of a parenting coordinator as including an educator, mediator, and thera-
pist); Gramieri v. City of N.Y., 806 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (referencing the
Court’s mediation and early case settlement programs); Matrix Int’l Textiles, Inc. v.
Jolie Intimates, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Civ. Ct. 2005) (mentioning the plaintiff’s com-
munications stating that the company “is not in a position to mediate th[e] dispute”);
Cocolicchio v. Rizzo, 800 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (referencing an ongoing medi-
ation); Borgus v. Marianetti, 801 N.Y.S.2d 230 (City Ct. 2005) (referencing the media-
tion component of the Monroe County Bar Association’s voluntary fee arbitration
program); In re Christine B., 799 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Fam. Ct. 2004) (discussing the victim’s
mother’s attempts to mediate the situation with respondent’s mother); Linda W. v.
Frank T., 799 N.Y.S.2d 161 (Fam. Ct. 2004) (noting a witness who served as a media-
tor between a divorced couple).
16. Town of Southampton v. N.Y. Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 813 N.E.2d
602, 605 (N.Y. 2004) (discussing a mediated settlement to enter a new collective bar-
gaining agreement within ninety days; the parties never executed a new agreement);
Brown v. Governele, 815 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div. 2006) (deciding what portions
of attorneys fees were owed to outgoing versus incoming attorneys in case resulting in
a $300,000 mediated settlement); 474431 Assocs. v. AXA Global Risks U.S. Ins. Co.,
795 N.Y.S.2d 626, 628 (App. Div. 2005) (describing a mediated settlement for
$130,000 that satisfied one of the plaintiff’s claims); Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 819
N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (discussing issues not resolved through mediation);
Gordon v. Roselli, 798 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (considering a claim for a dog
bite where a woman mediated a dispute between plaintiff and building owner); J.R.M.
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In the first of the six enforcement cases, Frazier v. Penraat,17 the
Family Court considered whether respondent should be liable to
petitioner for child support.  Petitioner raised numerous objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that respondent was not liable for
child support.18  Specifically, the petitioner argued that “more
weight should have been given to the parties’ mediated agreement
. . . in which respondent agreed to provide child support.”19  The
court concluded that the respondent was not responsible for paying
support to petitioner because the mediated agreement was subject
to change.20  The Appellate Division subsequently reversed the de-
cision,21 insofar as the lower court had determined not to order
compliance with the agreement.  After reviewing the details of the
mediated agreement,22 the court ordered the parties to comply
with its terms.23  The court noted that its decision was influenced
by the impossibility of determining the respondent’s income, and
thus child support calculations could not be accurately computed
under the Child Support Standards Act.24  Therefore, it appears
that if the respondent’s income could have been accurately com-
puted, the court may have ruled against enforcement of the agree-
ment and instead calculated the support under the Child Support
Standards Act.  The court’s decision to enforce a mediated agree-
ment with an acknowledgment that the court might rule against
enforcement in an appropriate scenario is a theme that emerges
from the examined cases.
In Agostini-Knops v. Knops,25 the Appellate Division considered
a mediated separation agreement in a divorce action.  The case
centered on one component of a stipulation agreement, reached
via mediation conducted by respondent.26  The agreement stated
v. P.A.M., 798 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Fam. Ct. 2004) (affirming the disqualification of an at-
torney from representing a client who was a party in a mediation that the attorney
mediated and resulted in settlement).
17. 799 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 2004), rev’d, 822 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 2006).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Frazier v. Penraat, 822 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 2006).
22. Id. at 23.  In an October 2001 mediated agreement, respondent agreed to pay
petitioner $600 per month toward a credit union loan for 18 months, and $600 per
month in child support. Id.  Respondent ceased paying in March 2002, and in May
2002, petitioner filed a petition for child support. Id.
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id.  Respondent was a self-employed businesswoman. Id. at 22.
25. 783 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (App. Div. 2004).
26. Id.  Respondent was the wife’s former attorney and also acted as a mediator in
the divorce action.
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that the husband would pay a $21,000 legal fee the wife owed to
respondent.27  On appeal, the wife argued that the settlement
should not be enforced and that the respondent should not be al-
lowed to retain the fee.28  The wife contended that that the fee was
excessive and that respondent violated the Procedure for Attor-
neys in Domestic Relations Matters (“the Regulation”)29 by failing
to provide her with a Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibil-
ities or a written retainer agreement.30  The court enforced the me-
diated agreement because the fee was not paid by the wife but by
the husband, and he was not seeking its return.31  Although the
court chose to enforce the mediated agreement, the court noted
that the respondent did not substantially comply with the Regula-
tion.32  The holding suggests that if the husband had contested the
respondent’s retention of the fee, the court might not have en-
forced the agreement because of the mediator’s violation of the
Regulation.  The court’s decision to enforce a mediated agreement
while mentioning a hypothetical wherein the court might rule oth-
erwise is similar to the approach taken in Frazier.
In Rachel C.H. v. Timothy S.,33 the New York state courts contin-
ued the trend of enforcing mediated agreements.  The court ruled
on five petitions filed in the matter.34  The unmarried parties en-
tered mediation, resulting in a mediated custody/visitation agree-
ment.35  The mediated agreement granted joint legal custody of the
parties’ child to both parents, but the mother retained primary
physical custody.36  The court approved the agreement.37  The
judge enforced the mediated agreement and held that the father of
the child violated the express terms of the mediated agreement.38
The court based its decision on evidence that the father smashed a
tape recorder in the presence of the child and, on another occasion,
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.1.
30. Agostini-Knops, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 329. See N.Y. COMP CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 1400.2-1400.3 (requiring the attorney to provide the client with a statement of
client’s rights and responsibilities and with a written retainer agreement).
31. Agostini-knops, 783 N.Y.S.2d at 329.  Further, the court noted that plaintiff
failed to allege “frivolous conduct warranting imposition of sanctions pursuant to 22
NYCRR part 130.” Id.
32. Id.
33. 2005 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 1282 (Sup. Ct. June 28, 2005).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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made vulgar statements about the child’s mother in the child’s
presence.39  The court denied the father’s petition seeking custody
of the child and refused to modify the mediated agreement40 be-
cause it found that the father did not meet his burden to establish
his right to custody of the child.41
Unlike the previous cases where a party argued against enforce-
ment of an agreement and desired nullification of the agreement,
in Rachel C.H. the father wanted the court to modify the agree-
ment.  Similarly, in McLeod v. O’Brien,42 the court addressed a
parent’s request for modification of a mediated custodial arrange-
ment, and the court upheld the original agreement.43  The divorced
parents mediated an arrangement whereby the mother had pri-
mary custody of the children, but the father spent a few days each
week with them.44  The mother filed a petition requesting permis-
sion to modify the custodial arrangement and allow her to relocate
to Oregon with the children.45  The court considered the mother’s
argument that the move offered an opportunity for her to earn a
larger income and improve the children’s quality of life, but ulti-
mately decided that the mother did not meet her burden of proof
to merit relocation of the children.46  Thus, the court continued the
trend among the New York state courts of honoring the terms of
mediated agreements.
Unlike the previous cases where one party sought permission
from the court to vacate or modify a mediated agreement and in
which child support and custody issues predominated, other cases
involve parties contesting the enforceability of mediated agree-
39. Id.  The mediated agreement provided that “[b]oth parties agree that neither
parent will argue or fight or speak ill of each other, toward each other or to any third
party while in the presence of the child.” Id.  Further that “[b]oth parties agree that
neither parent will do or say anything that will hamper a peaceful exchange during
any visitation drop off or pick up of their daughter.” Id.
40. Id.  The court also granted the mother’s petition to change residence. Id.  The
mediated agreement did not prevent the mother from moving. Id.  To accommodate
the move, the court crafted new visitation arrangements to replace the arrangements
agreed upon through mediation. Id.  Although the new arrangement expressly va-
cated the terms of the previous agreement, some of the language from the mediated
agreement was included in the new court-created agreement (e.g., “neither parent will
argue or fight or speak ill of each other, toward each other or to any third party[ ]
while in the presence of the child.”). Id.
41. Id.
42. 2004 N.Y. Misc LEXIS 2733 (Fam. Ct. Dec. 1, 2004).
43. Id.
44. Id.  The children also stayed with their father when their mother was away for
business, and for a portion of summer vacation. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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ments based on one or more contract defenses.  For example, in
Carney v. Carozza,47 the plaintiff brought an action against his for-
mer partners and their dental practice alleging that defendants
wrongfully terminated his partnership interest in violation of the
partnership agreement.  After the denial of motions for summary
judgment, the parties engaged in mediation,48 but they never spoke
to each other during the mediation.49  Instead, the mediator spoke
with the parties individually.50  Plaintiff claimed that he specifically
requested that a portion of the settlement amount reflect money to
offset income tax liability that he might sustain from selling his
partnership interest.51  Defendants agreed to increase the settle-
ment amount to include a sum to cover this contingency.52  The
parties signed the mediated agreement.53  Days later, plaintiff said
that he did not want to comply with the mediated agreement be-
cause he conditioned his acceptance of the agreement on beneficial
tax liability and the agreement did not satisfy that need.54  The de-
fendants moved for summary judgment based on the defense of
settlement and release.55  The trial court granted the motion.56
On appeal, the plaintiff raised two arguments to support his
claim that the mediated agreement should not be enforced.57
Before considering plaintiff’s arguments, the court stated that a
“stipulation of settlement is essentially a contract between the par-
ties which must be enforced according to its terms.”58  Addressing
plaintiff’s first argument, that the mediated agreement was merely
an “agreement to agree,” the court said that an agreement to agree
in the future is not enforceable.59  Moreover, for a contract to be
enforceable it must be definite as to all material terms.60  The court
found, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, that the signed mediation
agreement did contain all of the essential terms.61  After striking
down the first argument, the court considered plaintiff’s mutual
47. 792 N.Y.S.2d 642, 643 (App. Div. 2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 644.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 642 (citations omitted).
60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id.
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mistake of fact argument relating to the settlement’s impact on
plaintiff’s tax liability.62  Setting forth the standard for mutual mis-
take of fact, the court stated that “[a] contract or stipulation en-
tered into under a mutual mistake of fact is subject to rescission if
such mutual mistake existed at the time the contract was entered
into and is so substantial that the agreement does not represent a
true meeting of the parties’ minds.”63  The court also acknowl-
edged the public policy supporting enforcement of settlement
agreements.64  The court found that the plaintiff had not offered
clear and convincing evidence that either the agreement contained
a reference to tax benefits or that the defendants had any knowl-
edge that the alleged “condition” existed.65  The court enforced the
agreement,66 continuing the trend of New York state courts that
deny requests to set aside mediated agreements.
The discussion above details the enforcement issues courts faced
during the examined period.  One already mentioned theme is that
New York state courts tend to enforce mediated agreements.  In all
but one of the six cases involving enforcement of a mediated agree-
ment the court ruled in favor of enforcement.67  Further, in all but
two of the six decisions, the court ruled on enforcement issues in
family law matters such as support, child custody, or visitation.68  In
those cases, the parties were not challenging the agreement at the
time of its creation, but argued that circumstances changed after
the agreement was formed, which required modification of terms.
Of the two enforcement cases not involving a family law matter,
only Carney challenged the validity of a mediated agreement.  Part
II discusses comparable research that involved all fifty states and a
broader time period.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citations omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 644-45.
66. Id.
67. Although subsequently reversed, the one decision where the court did not en-
force an agreement was Frazier v. Penraat, 799 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 2004), rev’d
822 N.Y.S.2d 21 (App. Div. 2006).
68. New York courts only allow modification of custody arrangements when the
party demonstrates a sufficient change in circumstances. See Dintruff v. McGreevy,
346 N.Y.S.2d 399 (App. Div. 1973) (quoting Matter of Rondolfo v. Susan, 322
N.Y.S.2d 338 (App. Div. 1971)).
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II. ANALYSIS OF REPORTED UNITED STATES
DECISIONS GENERALLY
The issues in Carney—agreements to agree and mutual mistake
of fact—are two of the issues Professors James Coben and Peter
Thompson identified in their 2006 Harvard Negotiation Law Re-
view article, Disputing Irony:  A Systematic Look at Litigation
About Mediation.69  Coben and Thompson, professors at Hamline
University School of Law, analyzed all federal and state court deci-
sions involving mediation available on Westlaw for the years
1999 through 2003.70  This search produced 1223 decisions.71
Within those decisions, the issue courts most frequently addressed
was whether to enforce a mediation agreement when faced with a
challenge to the agreement.72  Specifically, 568 of the 1223 opinions
dealt with enforcement issues.73  In 362, or 63.7% of the 568 en-
forcement cases, courts upheld and enforced the challenged media-
tion agreement in whole or in part.74
Before discussing the arguments raised in the enforcement cases,
the authors hypothesized four different explanations for the high
percentage of cases in which agreements were enforced.75  First,
unfairness in mediation is relatively uncommon, as demonstrated
by studies finding high satisfaction among mediation participants.76
Second, courts tend not to scrutinize the fairness of agreements be-
cause mediated settlements translate into fewer cases for the courts
to resolve.77  Third, confidentiality rules prevent judicial review of
mediation processes, even if the processes are potentially unfair.78
Finally, traditional contract law does not ensure “fairness” in
mediations.79
69. See generally Coben & Thompson, supra note 3. R
70. Id. at 47.  The professors searched the Westlaw databases “allstates” and
“allfeds” for the term “mediat!”. Id. at 49.
71. Id. at 47.
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id.  Other issues included confidentiality, conduct of participants, sanctions,
fees, and costs. Id. at 57, 89, 112, 119.
74. Id. at 74.  The court refused to enforce in ninety-two cases, and remanded the
case in fifty-three cases. Id.
75. Id. at 74-75.
76. Id. at 74 (citing, for example, Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A “Party Satisfac-
tion” Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 885, 886 (1998)).
77. Id. at 74-75 (citing, for example, Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-
Connected Mediation:  What’s Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 836
n.247 (2001)).
78. Id. at 75.
79. Id.
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After offering their hypotheses for the high number of enforce-
ment cases, Coben and Thompson analyzed the cases involving me-
diated agreements.80  The authors found that the enforcement
cases raised the following six traditional contract defenses: (1) no
meeting of the minds/agreement to agree; (2) fraud/misrepresenta-
tion; (3) duress; (4) undue influence; (5) mistake; and (6) uncon-
scionability.81  Addressing the first category, the authors noted that
mediation is based on party self-determination, and any enforced
agreement must be an agreement by the parties and not one im-
posed on them.82  Coben and Thompson contend that when deter-
mining whether an agreement should be enforced, “[t]raditional
contract law centers on objective manifestation of assent—what
the parties said.”83  Addressing the type of situation raised in Car-
ney, the authors explained that “where a party manifests agree-
ment at the mediation but, free from the pressure of the mediation
session, has a change of heart, the party has no recognized contract
defense to an enforcement claim.”84  Under this analysis, the Car-
ney court was correct to exclusively consider the objective manifes-
tations of the parties and enforce the mediated agreement.  Some
ADR scholars, however, disagree about whether mediation’s goal
of self-determination is served by enforcing a settlement to which a
party agrees during mediation, but immediately thereafter re-
jects.85  These scholars would likely disagree with the Carney court.
Nevertheless, the majority of courts continue to enforce agree-
ments when a party requests rescission based upon a change of
mind or a realization that they made a poor bargain.86
Parties commonly allege fraud and misrepresentation as contract
defenses when contesting enforcement of a mediated agreement.87
According to Coben and Thompson, courts are willing to allow
parties to enter into “bad bargains.”  If it is a fraudulent statement,
however, that causes a party to agree then the agreement should
80. Id. at 77-89.
81. Id. at 77-87.  Two other categories for enforcement cases did not involve tradi-
tional contract defenses:  technical defenses and other defenses. Id. at 87-89.  Techni-
cal defenses include statute of limitations arguments and questions over whether the
agreement was signed by the appropriate party. Id. at 87-88.  Other defenses include
issues of interpretation, performance, and changed circumstances. Id. at 88-89.
82. Id. at 77.
83. Id. at 78.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Welsh, supra note 2, at 78. R
87. Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 80-81. R
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not be enforced.88  In order to succeed with a fraud or misrepresen-
tation claim, the party must prove the adverse party misrepre-
sented a material fact that induced the agreement, and that it was
reasonable to rely on the party’s statement.89
Duress, undue influence, and unconscionability are seldom
raised in enforcement cases.90  A successful duress argument re-
quires establishing a wrongful threat, which deprived the party of
free choice that resulted in an unfair agreement benefiting the
party who made the threat.91  Courts nearly always reject a duress
defense.92  In the decisions Coben and Thompson examined, not a
single court found undue influence.93  The few cases that addressed
unconscionability typically rejected the defense without extensive
analysis.94  The consistent rejection of these defenses most likely
contributes to the low number of new cases raising any of the de-
fenses.  This inference is supported by the lack of any of the ex-
amined New York state cases containing one of these defenses.
Mistake, the sixth and final category of traditional contract de-
fenses, and a defense raised in Carney, rarely convinces a court to
disregard a mediated agreement.95  To establish a mistake defense,
a plaintiff must demonstrate that the mistake is mutual and relates
to a material fact that is basic to the agreement.96  According to
Coben and Thompson, to claim unilateral mistake the plaintiff
must establish the basic elements of mutual mistake, and must
show that the adverse party either had reason to know of or caused
the mistake.97  In Carney, the court determined the plaintiff failed
to meet this burden.98  The court determined that the plaintiff had
not established the elements for a unilateral mistake claim, thus
compelling the court to properly enforce the mediated
agreement.99
88. Id. at 80.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Id. at 81, 83, 86.
91. Id. at 82.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 84.
94. Id. at 86.
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id. at 84.
97. Id. at 84 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981)); see
Carney v. Carozza, 792 N.Y.S.2d 642, 644-45 (App. Div. 2005).  Further, regardless of
whether the plaintiff is claiming mutual or unilateral mistake, the plaintiff cannot
have assumed the risk. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 84. R
98. See Carney, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
99. Id. at 644-45.
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III. COMPARISON OF REPORTED NEW YORK STATE DECISIONS
TO THE UNITED STATES GENERALLY
While Professors Coben and Thompson found that 568, or 46%,
of the 1223 decisions involving mediation raised enforcement is-
sues,100 only six out of ninety-eight, or 6.1%, of the New York state
mediation cases decided between January 1, 2004 and October 31,
2006 raised this issue.  Six enforcement cases in the New York re-
ported decisions over a thirty-four month span is an unexpectedly
low number.  Before discussing the significantly lower percentage
of enforcement cases in New York compared to the United States
more generally, it is necessary to note a few differences between
the research conducted in this Comment and the research Coben
and Thompson conducted.
There are three notable differences.  First, there is a difference in
the time periods considered.  The Coben and Thompson study con-
sidered mediation cases from 1999 to 2003,101 whereas this research
covered January 1, 2004 to October 31, 2006.  Nevertheless, this
difference should not result in a smaller number of enforcement
decisions.  On the contrary, based on the increased use of ADR
throughout the United States and particularly in New York in re-
cent years,102 the number of cases addressing enforcement should
logically have increased.  Second, Coben and Thompson analyzed
both federal and state reported decisions,103 whereas this research
considered exclusively New York state cases.  Finally, Coben and
Thompson researched on Westlaw,104 while the research here uti-
lized LexisNexis. However, this should not affect the results.
Regardless of the research differences, there must be an expla-
nation for the small percentage of New York state mediation en-
forcement cases.  Perhaps the disparity can be explained by a
combination of three theories: (1) attorneys recognize the futility
in challenging the validity of mediated agreements, (2) mediators
in New York’s court-annexed mediation programs are expected to
utilize a facilitative approach, which would lessen the likelihood of
parties challenging agreements, and (3) New York’s use of volun-
100. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 73. R
101. Id. at 47.
102. See OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS, THE N.Y.
STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF COURT OPERATIONS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAMS 2004-2005 ANNUAL REPORT 1, http://courts.state.
ny.us/ip/adr/publications/annual-reports/ar04-05.pdf.
103. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 47. R
104. See id.
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tary mediations, as compared to a state with mandatory media-
tions, decreases the chances of enforcement litigation.
A. Hypothesis One:  Futility of Traditional Contract Defenses
One hypothesis behind the small number of enforcement cases is
that attorneys and parties recognize that challenges to mediated
agreements are rarely successful when based on traditional con-
tract defenses and, therefore, choose not to assert such theories
when arguing against enforcement.105  The recognition of the low
likelihood of success of a traditional contract defense, however, is
not specific to New York and does not fully explain why there are
so few New York enforcement cases.
B. Hypothesis Two:  New York’s Facilitative Mediation
To better understand the small percentage of enforcement cases,
it is necessary to understand how New York courts utilize media-
tion.  Within the New York State Unified Court System there are
four mediation programs:  Statewide Community Dispute Resolu-
tion Centers, the Statewide Agricultural Mediation Program, New
York City court-based programs, and court-based programs
outside of New York City.106
Community Dispute Resolution Centers exist in all sixty-two
New York counties and are available through a partnership be-
tween the courts and local non-profit organizations.107  The Agri-
cultural Mediation Program, approved by the United States
Department of Agriculture, also is available in every county in the
state.108  The Family Court,109 Supreme Court,110 and the New
105. See id. at 49.
106. See New York State Unified Court System, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Programs, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/programs.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).  In
addition, of course, some parties may mediate outside the context of a court-annexed
program, and such a settlement could be subsequently litigated.
107. New York State Unified Court System, Community Dispute Resolution Cen-
ters, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/cdrc.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
108. New York State Unified Court System, New York State Agricultural Media-
tion Program, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/nysamp.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
109. New York State Unified Court System, New York City Family Court Media-
tion Services, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/NYCFamily.shtml (last visited Oct. 4,
2007).  Also, in conjunction with Community Mediation Services, the Family Court
Mediation Service handles child custody, visitation, juvenile delinquency, and person
in need of supervision cases. The New York City Child Permanency Mediation Pro-
gram handles child abuse and neglect matters. Id.
110. The Matrimonial Mediation Pilot Program offers mediations for divorcing
couples with children about custody and visitation matters.  New York State Unified
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York City Civil Court111 offer New York City court-based media-
tion programs.112  Outside of New York City, many judicial districts
have court-annexed mediation programs for specific matters, in-
cluding commercial cases, custody and visitation cases, and other
matrimonial matters.113  Mediation is prevalent throughout the
New York state courts in a variety of contexts.  Between April 1,
2004 and March 31, 2005 Community Dispute Resolution Center
mediators (“CDRCs”) conducted 15,025 mediations in New
York.114  The following fiscal year, April 1, 2005 through March 31,
2006, CDRCs conducted 16,878 mediations—a 12.3% increase
from the previous fiscal year.115
With an appreciation for the large number of cases mediated on
a yearly basis, it is important to recognize the types of mediation
models being utilized.  New York’s apparent adoption of the
facilitative model helps explain the low percentage of cases ad-
dressing enforcement of mediated agreements.116  The implemen-
tation of a facilitative, evaluative, bashing, or shuttle-diplomacy
approach to mediation117 can impact the likelihood of enforcement
issues arising.  Evaluative mediators assume that the parties want
“direction as to the appropriate grounds for settlement—based on
Court System, New York City Supreme Court ADR Programs, http://courts.state.ny.
us/ip/adr/NYCSupreme.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
111. Parties can mediate their small claims court or housing court matters.  New
York State Unified Court System, New York City Civil Court ADR Programs, http://
courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/NYCCivil.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
112. New York State Unified Court System:  ADR Programs in the New York City
Courts, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/court_annexed_NYC.shtml (last visited Oct. 4,
2007).
113. New York State Unified Court System, Court-Based Programs Outside New
York City, http://courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/court_annexed_OutsideNYC.shtml (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2007).
114. OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS, THE N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF COURT OPERATIONS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION CENTERS PROGRAMS 2004-2005 ANNUAL REPORT B2 tbl.1, http://courts.state.ny.
us/ip/adr/publications/annual-reports/ar04-05.pdf. (This total was reached by combin-
ing all cases from the table that were mediated in any form, including Full Agree-
ment, Partial Agreement, Verbal Agreement, and No Agreement.)
115. OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS, THE N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF COURT OPERATIONS, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION CENTERS PROGRAMS 2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT B2 tbl.1, http://courts.state.ny.
us/ip/adr/publications/annual-reports/ar05-06.pdf. (This total was reached by combin-
ing all cases from the table that were mediated in any form, including Full Agree-
ment, Partial Agreement, Verbal Agreement, and No Agreement.)
116. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. R
117. Scholars have recognized more mediation models than the four discussed here.
See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW &
POL’Y 7, 19-20 (1986) (discussing other bargaining and therapy mediation models).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-5\FUJ505.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-NOV-07 11:27
1566 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
law, industry practice or technology.”118  Further, evaluative
mediators urge parties to accept a particular settlement, predict
court outcomes, and assess strengths and weaknesses of legal
claims.119  Experienced attorneys and retired judges are the most
common people to utilize an evaluative mediation approach.120  As
Leonard Riskin stated, mediators with too much subject-matter ex-
pertise, such as an experienced attorney, are inclined to adopt an
evaluative approach.121  Evaluative mediation, however, is prob-
lematic because it reduces party self-determination,122 which is a
primary principle of mediation.  Evaluative mediators hinder the
ability of the parties to develop their own solutions.123  Without the
ability to control the outcome of mediation, a party may feel that
the mediation is unjust and subsequently object to settlement.
Thus, evaluative mediations increase the chances of enforcement
litigation.
The correlation between evaluative mediations and an increase
in enforcement litigation can be seen in Florida.  According to
Professors Coben and Thompson, out of eighty-three mediation
cases in Florida from 1999 through 2003,124 fifty-six cases dealt with
enforcement of a mediation agreement.125  Until recently, Florida
state courts conducted mediations almost exclusively through at-
torneys and retired judges.126 Since attorneys and retired judges
are the most likely to use evaluative mediation,127 Florida’s use of
these individuals leads to more evaluative mediation.  In compari-
118. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques 12 AL-
TERNATIVES 111 (1994).
119. See CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE & ANDREA KUPFER
SCHNEIDER, MEDIATION:  PRACTICE, POLICY, AND ETHICS 280 (2006).
120. See LISA B. BINGHAM, MEDIATION AT WORK:  TRANSFORMING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT AT THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 13 (2003), http://www.businessof
government.org/pdfs/bingham_report.pdf.
121. See Riskin, supra note 118. R
122. See Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation:  Concerns About
the Nature and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267,
270 (2001).
123. See Riskin, supra note 118. R
124. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 47 n.7. R
125. Id.
126. See PETITION OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION RULES AND POLICY 1-5, available at http://www.flcourts.org/gen_
public/adr/bin/ADRPetition.pdf; see also James J. Alfini, Symposium: Trashing,
Bashing, and Hashing it Out:  Is this the End of “Good Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 47, 49 n.9 (1991).
127. See Bingham, supra note 120. R
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son, mediators in New York are not required to be attorneys.128  In
the Coben and Thompson study there were only nineteen media-
tion cases in New York state courts, and only eight of those cases
dealt with enforcement.129  The consistent use of evaluative media-
tion logically leads to more enforcement litigation in Florida than a
state such as New York which allows non-attorneys to serve as
mediators130 and adopt a facilitative model.131  The empirical evi-
dence of Professors Coben and Thompson support these infer-
ences.132  As referenced above, since August 1, 2006, the Florida
Supreme Court has permitted non-attorneys to qualify as certified
mediators.133  To determine whether the use of evaluative media-
tion contributes to enforcement litigation, it would be beneficial to
examine the mediation-related litigation in Florida state courts five
years from now.  Fewer enforcement cases would indicate that the
attorneys’ and retired judges’ use of evaluative mediation contrib-
uted to the enforcement litigation.  This subsequent study should
also examine whether Florida has adopted a statewide mediation
model.
Adopting a more aggressive approach than an evaluative media-
tor, a “bashing mediator” immediately focuses on the settlement
offers raised by the parties and spends most of his or her time
“bashing away at those initial offers in an attempt to get the parties
to agree to a figure somewhere in between.”134  A “bashing media-
tor” envisions his or her role as someone “who guides” the parties
to a decision.135  However, the “bashing” approach is flawed be-
cause the mediator fails to “urge the parties to consider relevant
128. See New York State Standards and Requirements for Mediators and Media-
tion Trainers, http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Publications/Program%20Manual/
Chapter%207%20Training%20_Updated%201%20January%202007_.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Standards]; OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS, THE
N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF COURT OPERATIONS, COMMUNITY DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION CENTERS PROGRAMS 2005-2006 ANNUAL REPORT 6, http://courts.
state.ny.us/ip/adr/publications/annual-reports/ar05-06.pdf.  For example, during the
fall of 2006, while enrolled in law school, I served as a court-appointed mediator.
129. Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 47 n.7. R
130. Riskin, supra note 118.  It should be noted that during the period Professors R
Coben and Thompson examined, the Florida courts utilized mandatory mediation in
some circumstances.  This factor likely influenced the number of enforcement cases
during the examined period. See infra notes 142-57 and accompanying text. R
131. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text. R
132. See supra notes 120-23. R
133. See How to Become a Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator:  Step by
Step Guide, http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/adr/bin/How%20To%20Become%20
a%20Mediator.pdf
134. Alfini, supra note 126, at 69. R
135. Id.
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law, weigh their own values, principles, and priorities, and develop
an optimal outcome.”136
Another mediation approach is “shuttle diplomacy.”  The media-
tor meets with the parties individually through a series of caucuses
until an agreement is reached.137  This mediation approach is prob-
lematic because it does not afford parties the opportunity to listen
to the perspectives and arguments of the opposing party.  Ensuring
that such an opportunity exists is one of the principal roles of a
mediator.138  The mediator in the Carney case utilized a “shuttle
diplomacy” approach.139  The mediator helped the parties reach an
agreement without the parties ever speaking to each other during
the mediation.140  The absence of direct communication between
the parties inhibited their ability to listen to each other’s perspec-
tives and ultimately contributed to the enforcement litigation.
Unlike the aforementioned forms of mediation, a facilitative me-
diator’s mission is to enhance and clarify communication between
the parties.141  A facilitative mediator does not offer an assessment
of the parties’ positions for two reasons:  (1) offering an opinion
can impair the appearance of the mediator’s impartiality and
thereby hamper the mediator’s effectiveness, and (2) the mediator
may not know enough about the law or about the facts of the case
to offer an informed opinion.142
In New York, the organizations in charge of training individuals
to participate in Community Dispute Resolution Centers
(“CDRC”) and court-annexed mediation programs have devel-
oped training guidelines to ensure that the mediators are utilizing
the facilitative method.  For example, CDRC mediators are ex-
pected to utilize a facilitative approach to ensure that parties make
voluntary decisions.143  Specifically, the CDRC training curriculum
136. Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 939 (1997).
137. See Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil:  The Intoler-
able Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation Confi-
dentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715,
720 (1997).
138. See generally Love, supra note 136.
139. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. R
140. Id.
141. Riskin, supra note 118. R
142. Id.
143. OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS, THE N.Y. STATE
UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV OF COURT OPERATIONS, STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
NEW YORK STATE COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER MEDIATORS 3 (2005),
http:// www . nycourts . gov/ ip / adr / Publications / Info _ for _ Programs / Standards _ of _
Conduct_CDRC_Mediators.pdf.
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guidelines instruct training programs to include materials that “ex-
plain how mediators can create opportunities for party empower-
ment and help mediators understand the importance of party self-
determination.”144  The guidelines also provide that the training
materials should help mediators understand that parties’ communi-
cation skills may be enhanced during the mediation session and in
the future as a result of the parties’ experience in mediation.145
The training guidelines also explicitly direct trainers to discourage
mediators from proposing and choosing solutions for parties.146
This component demonstrates the CDRC’s commitment to avoid-
ing evaluative mediations in New York.  In addition, although not
stated in any official report or publication that could be found, it is
the understanding among individuals involved in New York state
court-annexed mediation programs that mediators are encouraged
to adopt the CDRC standards.  Further, because of the absence of
any other clearly articulated standards or guidelines, the CDRC
guidelines are generally followed in all court-annexed programs.
The use of a facilitative mediation approach in New York bene-
fits the courts because their dockets are not filled with contested
agreements.  More importantly, the use of the approach ensures
that parties are able to reach a final resolution to their disputes
through mediation and avoid subsequent litigation.  As Professor
Welsh noted, “[m]ediators who use facilitative techniques are more
likely to build parties’ investment in and likely compliance with a
settlement that the[ ] [parties] view as theirs.”147  Further, noncom-
pliance with a mediated agreement is more likely if the parties feel
they were “coerced, pressured, or forced to reach an
agreement.”148
Accordingly, as a court-appointed mediator in the New York
County Small Claims Court, I utilized a facilitative technique.149
After I explained the mediation process to the parties and an-
swered any questions, I gave each party a chance to voice their
concerns.  Rather than adopting an evaluative or bashing ap-
proach, I asked questions to enhance the communication between
the parties, ensure the parties understood each other, and create an
environment where the parties were in the best position possible to
144. Standards, supra note 128, at 9.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 11.
147. Welsh, supra note 2, at 91. R
148. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 213 (Thompson West
2003).
149. See supra note 1. R
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decide how to proceed.150  The parties settled their disputes in
more than half of the cases I mediated during the Fall of 2006.
More importantly, my use of a facilitative technique made it more
likely that both parties left the mediation feeling satisfied with
their agreement.
For example, in one case involving a dispute over a security de-
posit for an apartment, the defendant did not understand the ratio-
nale behind the amount the complainant sought.  I asked the
complainant to explain how he calculated the claimed sum, and the
defendant then understood the reasoning.  As a result, the defen-
dant agreed to settle the case without feeling that the settlement
amount was unjustified, which made it more likely that the defen-
dant would not subsequently contest enforcement.
If New York mediators utilize a facilitative technique without
evaluating the parties’ positions or forcing the parties to agree,
New York courts should hear few enforcement cases.  Parties who
settle after a facilitative mediation are more likely to feel satisfied
with the result than in any other type of mediation.
C. Hypothesis Three:  New York’s Use of Voluntary Mediation
A third hypothesis to explain the significantly lower number of
New York state enforcement of mediated agreement decisions is
that New York offers mediation as a voluntary dispute resolution
mechanism.  Proponents of mandatory mediation argue that a
mandatory process eliminates the concerns that a party may feel
weak for suggesting mediation, eases the burden on court dockets,
and offers an opportunity to educate parties about the benefits of
mediation.151  Advocates also contend that mandatory mediation,
which is nonbinding in most situations, is beneficial because parties
are able to mediate and still have the opportunity to litigate their
dispute if no mediated agreement is reached.152  This argument
fails to recognize that parties who settle during mandatory media-
tion may do so only because they feel pressured to resolve their
dispute.153  Another problem with mandatory mediation is that it
requires people to speak in a setting they did not choose.154
Mandatory mediation also shifts control from the parties to the
150. See Riskin, supra note 118. R
151. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 119, at 286. R
152. See Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 2, at 388. R
153. See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
A NUTSHELL 91 (West Group 2001); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:  Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1582 (1991).
154. See Grillo, supra note 153, at 1549-50.
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courts for the sole purpose of reducing the dockets.155  Addition-
ally, mediation is typically described as a voluntary process that
promotes party self-determination.  Thus, mandatory mediation
contradicts one of the core principles of mediation.156
The use of mandatory mediation will lead to an increase in litiga-
tion.157  Coben and Thompson’s empirical data supports this argu-
ment.  In California, a majority of court-annexed mediations are
mandatory.158 Mandatory mediations occur at both the appel-
late159 and trial levels.160  In comparison, in New York all media-
tions are voluntary.  The training curriculum guidelines for CDRC
mediators state that training materials should include a model
opening statement that explains the voluntary nature of the pro-
cess.161  The training guidelines explicitly refer to the voluntary na-
ture of the process, indicating the commitment to voluntary
mediations in New York.  Moreover, in my own experience, before
mediating a case I always explained to parties that they were par-
ticipating in a voluntary mediation process and at any time could
elect to withdraw from the process and appear before a judge to
settle their dispute.162  Further, the mediations I conducted were
not part of a CDRC program; rather, I participated through one of
the New York City court-based programs.  This demonstrates that
the commitment to voluntary mediation in New York is not exclu-
sive to CDRCs.
As referenced above, California’s use of mandatory mediations
contributes to an increase in enforcement litigation.  Of the 1223
cases Coben and Thompson examined, 122 cases were from Cali-
fornia state courts.163  Fifty-one of the 122 California state cases
155. See Campbell C. Hutchinson, The Case for Mandatory Mediation, 42 LOY. L.
REV. 85, 90-91 (1996).
156. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 119, at 286. R
157. See Streeter-Schaefer, supra note 2, at 388. R
158. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT: PROGRESS
THROUGH UNITY 23, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/ar2006.pdf;
MANDATORY MEDIATION IN THE FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF THE COURT OF AP-
PEAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS iii-iv, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/refer-
ence/documents/mediation.pdf (hereinafter MANDATORY MEDIATION); JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, EVALUATION OF THE EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PRO-
GRAMS xix, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/empprept.pdf (hereinaf-
ter EARLY MEDIATION).
159. MANDATORY MEDIATION, supra note 158, at  iii-iv.
160. EARLY MEDIATION, supra note 158, at xix.
161. Standards, supra note 128, at 10.
162. See supra note 1. R
163. Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 47 n.7. R
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raised an enforcement issue.164  By comparison, only nineteen of
the 1223 cases were from New York state courts.165  Of those
nineteen cases, only eight dealt with enforcement issues.166  During
the examined period, 1999 through 2003, New York courts only ad-
dressed eight enforcement cases, as compared to California’s fifty-
one cases.167  While some of the disparity may be explained by the
greater number of cases mediated in California, New York’s use of
voluntary mediations is unquestionably part of the explanation.
D. The Future of New York State Mediations
Although the amount of New York state enforcement cases that
exist are low, it is important to reduce the number of enforcement
of mediated agreement cases to ensure that the goals of mediation
remain intact.  Professor Nancy Welsh considered a few solutions
and ultimately advocated for expanding the utilization of cooling-
off periods during which parties can rescind an agreement.168  The
solutions Welsh considered, but ultimately rejected include:  rede-
fining “self-determination” in statutes, rules, and ethical guidelines;
greater public education to ensure parties understand the media-
tion process; increased mediator education on techniques to ensure
party self-determination; lowering the burden of proof required to
demonstrate coercion to a probable cause standard; and revising
the mediator code of ethics to prohibit undue influence.169  In con-
trast to these proposals, allowing a three-day non-waiveable cool-
ing-off period170 is an ideal solution because it allows parties to
decide what is in their best interests.171  Allowing a period of time
to lapse before a mediated agreement becomes final ensures that
parties are not coerced into settlement by an aggressive media-
tor,172 or by another party or a non-party.  Some argue that the
proposed solution is not perfect.173  For example, according to
Professors Coben and Thompson, issues of undiscovered fraud or
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 79-92. R
169. See id.
170. See id. at 87.  Professor Welsh recognized that there would need to be excep-
tions to this practice for situations including mediation on the eve of trial and when
parties desired to be bound immediately. Id. at 90-91.
171. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 136. R
172. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 5-7. R
173. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 136. R
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mistake will remain.174  If the other party can easily rescind the
agreement, however, the first party would be less likely to engage
in fraudulent conduct or allow a mistake to occur.175  Regardless of
any shortcomings, Welsh’s proposal is the most effective way to
ensure the goals of mediation are met and to aid parties in avoiding
litigation over mediated settlements.176
IV. THE PROPER ROLE FOR COURTS IN CONSIDERING
WHETHER TO ENFORCE A MEDIATED AGREEMENT
Debate exists over whether the purpose of mediation is defeated
when a court is forced to decide whether to enforce a mediated
agreement.177  Some judges have noted that they are not trained or
qualified to understand the intricacies of the mediation process.178
Moreover, confidentiality issues arise when a court decides
whether to enforce an agreement.179  Should mediation, intended
to be a private process,180 be brought within the adjudicative scope
of the courts?
In weighing this dilemma it is pertinent to consider the differ-
ences between mediation and litigation, where the latter is a public
process.  Many ADR scholars have noted the advantages of media-
tion over litigation:  mediation enhances communication, fosters
collaboration, encourages problem solving, offers the ability to
structure the future to build new opportunities, is efficient, and al-
lows parties to craft acceptable solutions.181  In other words, as
mentioned in this Comment, mediation offers party self-determina-
tion, which is the central feature of mediation.182  In contrast, litiga-
tion is prohibitively expensive, slow, does not provide party
participation and control over the process, produces unsatisfactory
174. See id.
175. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 89. R
176. See Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 136. R
177. See KOVACH, supra note 148, at 140-43. R
178. See Roland Beaudoin, To Change is Simple, To Improve is Difficult (A Cau-
tionary Note), 17 ME. B. J. 188, 190 (2002).
179. See Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Me-
diation—Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Re-
ality of Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 518-19 (2004).
180. See generally NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 153. R
181. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 119, at 92-93. See also Welsh, supra R
note 2, at 4. R
182. See MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., supra note 119, at 92. See also Welsh, supra R
note 2, at 4. R
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outcomes, and is adversarial.  Litigation lessens the chances of par-
ties interacting positively in the future.183
Despite the noted problems associated with litigation, one could
argue that enforcement of mediation agreements produces positive
results.  In Olam v. Congress Mortgage,184 United States Magistrate
Judge Wayne Brazil stated that enforcing a mediated settlement
would encourage parties interested in mediation to utilize the
court’s mediation program, ensure that parties in the future take
mediations seriously, help parties understand that mediation is an
opportunity to reach closure and avoid trial, and encourage parties
to pay close attention to the terms of proposed mediated
agreements.185
Judge Brazil raised valid points about these positive results but
these points assume that adjudication of disputed mediated settle-
ments is appropriate.  As Professors Coben and Thompson stated,
“[g]iven the oft-expressed mediation objective of providing an al-
ternative to the traditional adversarial system, the phenomenon of
mediation litigation is a ‘disputing irony’ that warrants closer ex-
amination.”186  If the central feature of mediation is self-determina-
tion by the parties, the courts’ involvement in the process appears
to defeat the purpose of mediation.
CONCLUSION
New York courts, as compared to the rest of the United States,
hear significantly fewer enforcement of mediated agreement cases.
The hypotheses above explain possible reasons for this difference.
Until an approach is adopted to eliminate enforcement litigation,
the courts and other individuals involved in decision-making
should consider whether court involvement in contested mediation
agreements is appropriate.  If decision-makers determine that the
courts should not be involved, the next issue is how to resolve the
contested agreements.  This is a topic for a subsequent comment.
For now, New York’s approach to mediation is successful and
should be considered by other states that are faced with high per-
centages of enforcement litigation.
183. See Welsh, supra note 2, at 93. R
184. 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
185. See id. at 1137.
186. Coben & Thompson, supra note 3, at 47 (citation omitted). R
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TABLE 1
Total Number of New York State Reported Cases
Between January 1, 2004 and October 31, 2006
Month Year Number of Cases
January 2004 1186
February 2004 1655
March 2004 1949
April 2004 1801
May 2004 1665
June 2004 2436
July 2004 1185
August 2004 938
September 2004 1352
October 2004 1794
November 2004 1818
December 2004 2008
January 2005 1378
February 2005 1804
March 2005 1992
April 2005 1745
May 2005 1670
June 2005 2291
July 2005 1392
August 2005 1074
September 2005 1671
October 2005 1627
November 2005 1721
December 2005 1981
January 2006 1512
February 2006 1842
March 2006 2016
April 2006 1868
May 2006 1862
June 2006 2122
July 2006 1658
August 2006 1291
September 2006 1583
October 2006 1520
Total Number of Cases: 57407
Total Number of New York State Cases (as reported by LexisNexis search on November 8,
2006 of ‘NY State Cases, combined’ database)
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